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Abstract 6 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ has been investigated for several decades. At its centre is the 7 
question whether a common resource will collapse under over-exploitation. The isolated 8 
analysis of one resource has many conceptual benefits, yet in reality resources and welfare are 9 
intertwined. In this paper, we investigate a situation where a resource which is exploited for 10 
profit has the additional feature of protecting against risk. Our main question is whether 11 
participants in an experimental game will prioritize such additional feature over maximizing 12 
profit and, if so, to what extent. Therefore, we designed a forest-harvesting game: Participants 13 
can harvest trees to generate income, and at the same time the forest serves as a protection 14 
against floods. Communication has been shown to play a vital role in managing commons. Our 15 
second aim is to test the importance of communication when the resource functions as a device 16 
of protecting against external risk. Lastly, we introduce a new perspective to the tragedy of the 17 
commons literature. Specifically, we investigate how the anthropologically motivated theory of 18 
risk perception (often called Cultural Theory) correlates with behaviour in our economic game. 19 
We believe that there is much potential in combining insights from these separate disciplines. 20 
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1. Introduction 23 
 24 
The sustainable use of common resources is one of the major challenges humanity has to face 25 
this century. Such resources include global climate, clean air, civil security, social security, the 26 
internet, and all living resources with shared ownership, such as stocks of fish and game. In 27 
many situations, common resources can be accessed by individuals without or with low 28 
restrictions. Therefore, they are threatened by over-exploitation. In the worst case, this may lead 29 
to the collapse of the entire resource, to a “tragedy of the commons”. This term was coined by 30 
the influential work by Garret Hardin (Hardin 1968), where it is argued that such a tragedy is 31 
inevitable in many cases. Indeed a simplified game-theoretic model of such a situation, the 32 
public goods game (PGG), permits only selfish exploitation as equilibrium. Why then can we 33 
observe that many real commons can be managed consistently and without collapsing for a 34 
significant amount of time? 35 
In the extended research on this topic, two classes of explanations arose. The first 36 
explains the gap between theory and observation by questioning the classical assumption of 37 
purely self-interested agents (homo oeconomicus). Instead of maximizing their expected 38 
utilities, individuals are suspected to have different goals. Prominent examples are risk 39 
preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Raub and Snijders 1997, Gintis 2000, Holt and 40 
Laury 2002, Hilbe et al. 2013), pro-social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Fehr and 41 
Fischbacher 2002, Bénabou and Tirole 2006) or essentially different rationalities (Douglas and 42 
Wildavsky 1983, Thompson et al. 1990). In the second class of explanations, it is argued that 43 
realistic common goods situations often exhibit additional features or restrictions which are 44 
essential for maintaining cooperation. This means that even self-interested agents can cooperate 45 
if there are suitable mechanisms which ensure that cooperation pays off in the long run. 46 
Specifically, behaviour in a particular PGG may have impact on repeated interactions with the 47 
same social partners, or affect one’s reputation (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Nowak and 48 
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Sigmund 1998, Leimar and Hammerstein 2001, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004, Berger 2011). 49 
Monitoring and sanctioning systems can provide incentives to support or enforce cooperative 50 
behaviour (Fehr and Gächter 2002, Hauert et al. 2007, Maier-Rigaud et al. 2010, Rustagi et al. 51 
2010, Sigmund et al. 2010, Zhang et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2015). In this case, models have 52 
shown that even self-interested agents should behave cooperatively under many circumstances, 53 
because it is in their own long-term interest. It is likely that both classes of explanations are 54 
relevant to understand the many examples of non-collapsing common goods situations in the 55 
real world.  56 
Our main goal is to shed light on mechanisms that govern human-environment 57 
interactions. In the traditional tragedy of the commons, the tragedy consists of society losing 58 
one particular resource due to over-exploitation. However, in many typical environmental 59 
issues, this is not the main problem. Instead, it is the consequences on the environment: We 60 
may be less worried about the profits of the forest industry than about the extended effects of 61 
deforestation on the rest of the world. Surprisingly, literature on economic experiments is 62 
largely focused on direct effects of a single resource. We designed an experimental game in 63 
order to see how awareness of such additional effects affects sustainable management of a 64 
resource. In the long run, we aim to build upon the present work to enrich the concept of present 65 
economic experiments in a way that goes beyond overly simplistic decisions. In an attempt to 66 
ensure tractability and an incremental accumulation of insights, this work shall serve as the first 67 
step in that direction. Therefore, the multiplicity of decisions is still rather limited compared to 68 
realistic scenarios. Specifically, we added exactly one additional layer of complexity beyond 69 
the well-studied common-pool resource game: The resource gathered for profit has the 70 
additional feature of protecting against external risk so that its depletion increases that risk. 71 
Our first and main research question is whether participants will prioritize such a second 72 
feature over maximizing profit and, if so, to what extent. To embody such a situation, we use 73 
the context of a forest-harvesting game: participants can harvest trees from a stylized forest to 74 
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generate income. Additionally, the forest serves as a protection against floods (e.g., EEA 2015). 75 
However, we chose values such that the damage from floods is relatively low. Thus, the game-76 
theoretic structure of a social dilemma is not resolved, in particular, the addition of flood risk 77 
does not change the Nash equilibrium of the game (see Appendix A3). According to 78 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, some individuals are likely to weight losses 79 
stronger than gains (loss aversion). We therefore expect that the risk of floods will make 80 
participants more careful and hence more efficient in managing the resource. 81 
Communication has been identified as a major driving force to resolving the tragedy of 82 
the commons (Cardenas et al. 2004). Thus, our second hypothesis concerns the role of 83 
communication in our setting. Apart from hoping to provide a replication of the cooperation-84 
enhancing effect of communication, we want to identify whether the effect of our first 85 
hypothesis holds with and/or without the possibility of communication. 86 
In addition, we introduce a different angle to the subject using the theory of plural 87 
rationality (also called cultural theory; see, e.g., Thompson et al. 1990, Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 88 
2003, Verweij and Thompson 2006)4, which postulates that stakeholder discourses (or voices) 89 
are plural but limited in number. The discourses stem from different social contexts, which, in 90 
turn, are shaped by the ways in which people organize, perceive and justify their social relations. 91 
The theory argues that there are four ways of organizing (thus the limited number of 92 
discourses): hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Individual tendencies to 93 
accord with these four ways we shall call worldviews. It is very likely that such worldviews 94 
affect behaviour in social dilemma games. However, due to lack of overlap between the 95 
respective disciplines, little is known about such a possible connection. As a first step into 96 
filling this gap, we used a questionnaire on the worldviews of participants and correlated it with 97 
                                                          
4 Originally developed by Mary Douglas (1978) as a "heuristic device" or "analytical scheme", it is a 
cultural theory – a theory of cultural bias, to be precise – but it all too easily gives the mistaken 
impression that it is culture that is doing the explaining.  "Plural rationality" avoids that; it also helps 
position this theory in relation to those – rational choice and post-structuralism – that it challenges. 
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their behaviour in the game. Since this is – to our best knowledge – the first study connecting 98 
these scientific areas, it is difficult to give specific hypothesis on the direction of correlations. 99 
Further work must address this question more specifically in order to disentangle correlation 100 
and causation of worldviews and pro-social behaviour.  101 
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2. Material and methods 102 
 103 
2.1. The participants 104 
We conducted computerized experiments with 320 students, tested in fall 2015 and spring 2016. 105 
Students were recruited via the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and 106 
represented a broad range of disciplines. They were composed of 48.7% females. Upon arrival 107 
participants were randomly seated in front of computers separated by opaque partitions. 108 
Participants were informed via written instructions (see Appendix A1) about the game rules 109 
and were informed that their decisions would be made anonymous to the other participants and 110 
the experimenters. They were forbidden to communicate except via computers. To allow for 111 
in-game identification while ensuring anonymity with regard to their real identity, participants 112 
were given pseudonyms (in each of the groups of five we used the names Helike, Ferin, Ananke, 113 
Metis and Kalisto, which are names of moons of the solar system, cf. Bednarik et al. 2014). 114 
Sessions lasted approximately 70 minutes and participants earned €17.12 ± €4.96. After the 115 
game, participants filled out a questionnaire indicating their worldviews on various topics (see 116 
Appendix A4. For the questionnaire analysis, only part A of the questionnaire was used.). 117 
 118 
2.2. Game rules and treatments 119 
In fall 2015, we conducted eight groups for each of the five treatments (described below) with 120 
five participants in each group. In spring 2016, we conducted eight groups for each of three 121 
treatments, one of which was the same as in 2015. Thus, we have in total seven treatments, each 122 
with eight groups except one treatment with 16 groups. The reason is that the initial five 123 
treatments all included the option to communicate via chat-box, which we controlled for in the 124 
second cohort of experiments. We shall first explain the detailed rules of the simplest treatment 125 
and later the additional rules of the subsequent treatments: 126 
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Time was allocated for the participants to read the written instructions and to ask 127 
questions, after which the experimenter started the game. Each round of the game consisted of 128 
two phases: i) the operations phase and ii) the results phase. The participants were informed 129 
about the total length of the game, which was 20 rounds. In the operations phase, participants 130 
could harvest trees from a forest that was represented by an 8x10 matrix (Figure 1), where each 131 
cell or patch contained one tree. Initially, all patches were filled by trees. For each harvested 132 
tree, the participants received €0.10. Apart from the show-up fee (€5), this was the only source 133 
of the participants’ income. In the operations phase, participants could continuously harvest 134 
trees for one minute. In the results phase, which also lasted one minute, participants had the 135 
opportunity to check their own and other players’ earnings, and prepare their strategy for the 136 
next round. At the beginning of each new round, a specified proportion of the forest regrew. 137 
For each existing tree, one additional tree regrew, up to a maximum of 80 trees. Additionally, 138 
5 trees grew each round independently of existing trees unless the maximum of 80 trees was 139 
reached already. 140 
 141 
Figure 1. The forest game. In each group, five players may click on a tree to harvest it and 142 
receive profit points. In treatments with rainfall, trees serve an additional function: to protect from 143 
floods. If the rainfall intensity exceeds the size of the forest, players will be subject to flood damage, 144 
reducing their payoffs. In the example shown above, the rainfall is fully absorbed by the sufficiently 145 
large forest and no damage occurs. 146 
 147 
 148 
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In five treatments, participants were permitted to communicate throughout the entire 149 
experiment via chat-box, using their pseudonyms. During each round, a certain (fixed or 150 
random as explained below) amount of precipitation occurred. The uncut forest served as flood 151 
protection. If the precipitation exceeded the capacity of the uncut trees to absorb the water, a 152 
flood occurred and reduced participants’ payoffs. The treatment without the possibility of 153 
floods was labelled NOFLO. The other treatments with chat-box followed a 2×2 design. 154 
Rainfall could happen REGularly or IRRegularly and the resulting flood losses could be 155 
distributed EQually or Unequally (hence these treatments were labelled REGEQ, REGUN, 156 
IRREQ and IRRUN). In all treatments except NOFLO, rainfall occurred at the end of each 157 
operations phase. The rainfall intensity was either 25 for REG treatments or a random number 158 
between 0-50 for IRR treatments (the sequence of the numbers was pre-generated with the 159 
condition that the mean was exactly 25). The uncut forest had the capability of absorbing runoff 160 
from the rain: Each tree reduced the potential flooding intensity by one point. If the resulting 161 
intensity was reduced to 0 or below, no flood occurred. Otherwise, the resulting flood inflicted 162 
damage which was deducted from players’ payoffs. The total flood damage was estimated as 163 
the difference between the rainfall intensity (0-50) minus the number of uncut trees. The flood 164 
damage was distributed to the players (reducing their payoffs) either equally (in EQ treatments) 165 
or unequally (in UN treatments). In the latter case, one player bore 50% of the flood damage, 166 
one player 25%, one player 15%, one player 10% and one player 0%. This damage distribution 167 
was different in each round (randomly, but modified to ensure the same sums of weights over 168 
all rounds for all players). Regardless of whether the distribution of damage was equal or 169 
unequal the flood damage did not outweigh individual profits from harvesting trees. Even if the 170 
forest was at its minimal water carrying capacity, each harvested tree gave one point to the 171 
harvester while it caused only between 0 and 0.5 points (on average: 0.2 points) damage.  172 
In addition to these five treatments, we ran the treatments NOFLO and REGEQ without 173 
the chat-box, which we shall refer to as NOFLO-NC and REGEQ-NC. In the second cohort we 174 
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also ran another 8 groups with the REGEQ treatment. In summary, we had 7 treatments, with 175 
8 groups of 5 players in each treatment, except for REGEQ, where we had 16 groups. Thus, we 176 
had (7+1) × 8 = 64 groups, meaning that a total of 320 participants were tested. 177 
 178 
2.3. Statistical analysis 179 
Except where specifically indicated, we used group averages as our statistical units since the 180 
behaviour of individual participants within each group was interdependent. For statistical 181 
analysis R 3.2.1 (R Core Team 2013) was used. Probabilities are reported as two tailed at a 5%-182 
significance level.  183 
 184 
  185 
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3. Results 186 
3.1. Flood risk reduces over-harvesting 187 
  188 
Figure 2. Average fraction of remaining trees per round for each of the seven treatments (abbreviations 189 
see in methods section 2.2). Clearly, treatments without the possibility of chat communication perform 190 
poorly. Further, the groups’ ability to maintain a larger number of trees is also affected by the possibility 191 
of floods. 192 
 193 
Average forest condition (% of uncut trees) is higher in the flood treatments than in the no flood 194 
treatment (27.47±15.12 vs. 10.77±14.23, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: W = 171, p < 0.001, see Fig. 195 
2), which suggests that the risk of floods mitigates the social dilemma of forest management. 196 
However, the resulting increase in efficiency was not sufficient to compensate for occasional 197 
losses from floods. Hence, the final payoffs were not significantly different in treatments with 198 
and without floods. Interestingly, however, individual payoffs were significantly negatively 199 
correlated with individual harvest rate (the percentage each individual harvested from each 200 
round’s initial forest condition, averaged over all 20 rounds, Pearson’s r = 0.179, df = 318, p = 201 
0.0013). This can be interpreted as evidence for “nice guys finish first”, because high individual 202 
harvest rates often imply an early deforestation. After that, a collective agreement to abstain 203 
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from harvesting in order to regrow the forest is difficult. As a result, individual earnings of all 204 
group members can be reduced.  205 
3.2. Uncertainty impacts behaviour 206 
Contrary to the differences to the NOFLO-treatment, all treatments with floods showed similar 207 
behaviour when averaged over the entire game duration. However, on a closer look there exist 208 
clear differences in behaviour of groups in treatments with irregular rainfall compared to the 209 
rest. In the first round, nearly all (57 of 64) groups deforested the entire area. Of the seven 210 
groups that did not deforest the entire area, five belonged to the irregular treatments (IRREQ or 211 
IRRUN). This is especially remarkable because in the first round, players had little time to 212 
gather experience about the game or to communicate. Evidence for risk-averse behaviour is 213 
found when looking at the optimal harvesting rate. The maximum regeneration in all treatments 214 
was 42 trees per round which could be achieved by leaving 38 trees and harvesting the rest. 215 
Groups in the irregular treatment tended to leave more trees than 38 significantly more often 216 
than other groups (36.56±26.57 vs. 15.83±15.58, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: W = 281.5, p = 217 
0.0132). Because rainfall was unpredictable in these treatments (IRREQ and IRRUN), it is 218 
likely that these groups tried to build up a buffer to prevent flood damage. 219 
3.3. No cooperation without communication 220 
As expected, communication appears to play a vital role in managing common goods: Average 221 
forest condition is higher in the chat treatments than in the no chat treatments (30.53±12.01 vs. 222 
1.57±4.38, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: W = 29, p < 0.000001, cf. Fig. 2). Further, among those 223 
treatments with chat, we find a tendency that longer chat communication correlates with higher 224 
levels of cooperation, i.e., lower levels of over-harvesting (Pearson’s r = 0.258, t = 1.6456, df 225 
= 38, p = 0.108).  226 
 227 
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3.4. Worldviews matter 228 
As mentioned in the section 1, we made a first step for building a bridge to the 229 
sociologically/anthropologically driven theory of plural rationalities, which states that social 230 
interactions depend on four distinct worldviews: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and 231 
fatalism. We applied a post-game questionnaire to elicit worldviews of the players, and 232 
compared the four worldviews with the group outcomes. The questionnaire allowed us to score 233 
participants on each of the worldviews on a scale 1-10. Linking group averages of the individual 234 
scores with average group forest condition resulted in the correlations show in Figure 3. 235 
Egalitarian affinities improve a group’s ability to preserve the forest (positive correlation), 236 
whereas individualistic and fatalistic affinities have a slightly opposite effect (negative 237 
correlations). This finding is in line with the theory’s predictions, because preserving 238 
environment and sharing resources equally are assumed to be predominantly egalitarian traits. 239 
 240 
Figure 3. Group averages of worldview scores plotted against group averages of remaining trees. Each 241 
circle represents a group’s average score on one of the four worldviews plotted against the same 242 
group’s average number of remaining trees. 243 
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4. Discussion 244 
The conducted experiments show the influence of shared benefits, communication, and 245 
individual worldviews on the outcome of a common-pool resource management game. The 246 
addition of group-level benefits for reducing the harvest rate improves the group outcomes in 247 
terms of the forest sustainability in all treatments with and without communication. One 248 
explanation for this result is based on risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The flood 249 
damage affects everyone (although not always to the same extent, depending on the treatment) 250 
which means that individual over-harvesting does not only destroy the potential long-term 251 
benefits, but also leads to direct costs in terms of flood damage. Although the addition of flood 252 
risk does not change the dominant individual strategy leading to overharvesting, by reframing 253 
the context, it may trigger different heuristics for making harvesting decisions (Shaffer et al. 254 
2011). The potential of flood losses, by adding an external source of uncertainty (besides 255 
uncertainty related to decisions of other players), increases cognitive processing required to 256 
assess the decision with a best individual outcome. In such situations, players may rely more 257 
on simple heuristics (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000) – in this case lowering the harvest. It has been 258 
demonstrated that such simple heuristics can perform better than decisions guided by optimal 259 
outcomes, in highly uncertain situations (Pflug et al. 2012). In future studies we will try to 260 
assess to what extent participants are aware of the game-theoretic individual optimum decisions 261 
and if additional risk induces a deviation from this decision or, alternatively, if they switch to a 262 
different decision mode using one of simple heuristics. 263 
The results linking individual cultural theory-based characteristics with the behaviour 264 
in the common-pool resource experiments show that egalitarian worldviews are correlated with 265 
more sustainable strategies. This demonstrates a potential for cultural theory to add another 266 
classification to the repertoire of other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) that 267 
may explain and enrich our understanding of how different combinations of player types may 268 
lead to more sustainable behaviour. A number of studies investigating cultural effects on the 269 
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behaviour of participants in experimental economics games have revealed interesting patterns 270 
(Prediger et al. 2011, Ghate et al. 2013). Cultural theory seeks to explain cultural differences 271 
by addressing four “ways of life” that are present within any specific culture (as addressed by 272 
anthropological and psychological literature). The results we obtained are consistent with the 273 
understanding of the key instruments used by different solidarities: individualists relying on 274 
incentives, hierarchists relying on rules and egalitarians relying on norms. In the absence of 275 
incentives and rules in the game design, egalitarians are more likely to overcome the social 276 
dilemma and achieve more sustainable outcomes. At the same time, a well-functioning group 277 
which results in good forest management could make participants respond stronger to 278 
egalitarian values. Further research is needed to investigate the causal interactions between 279 
participants’ behaviour and worldviews. 280 
Finally, it is important to emphasize the dynamic form of resource representation in the 281 
experiments. Although it is now common to investigate the common-pool resource situation 282 
with the static resource model (as in public goods games), such a representation misses the 283 
critical component of the resource dynamics. The participants’ harvesting decisions affect the 284 
resource state that may lead to a case-specific trajectory, adding the history dimension that may 285 
in turn induce path-dependency. Effectively, participants’ decisions depend not only on 286 
decisions of others from previous rounds but also on the state of the resource itself. This 287 
additional complexity can increase the difficulty of identifying the players’ strategies; however, 288 
the findings better represent actual decision-making in common-pool resource situations. 289 
 290 
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